



Security Fabric for Operational Networks

Ionut Davidoiu Cisco BDM RRC Romania

What is Digitization? What is IoT?

"Use Technology to change Business Outcomes – transform business"

- Business Outcomes
- Data Driven
- Continuous Innovation
- Sustaining Competitive Differentiation

"loT is an enabler for Digitization"

Industrialization of Hacking There is a multi-billion dollar global industry targeting your prized assets



Recent attacks on IoT

Thu Feb 25, 2016 6:52pm EST

Related: WORLD, TECH, CYBERSECURITY

U.S. government concludes cyber attack caused Ukraine power outage

WASHINGTON | BY DUSTIN VOLZ



1,400 Flaws Found in Outdated CareFusion Medical Systems

By Eduard Kovacs on March 30, 2016

FBI investigating cyber attack at MedStar Health

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Priority shifts in IoT

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Security Policies		IT Network	IoT Network	
Focus	Protecti	ing Intellectual Property and Company Assets	24/7 Operations, High OEE, Safety, and Ease of	Use
Priorities		Security in IoT networks financial systems o cyber/phy	is crucial as people, communities, and could be negatively impacted by sical security breaches	
Types of Data Traffic	Co Voice	e and Video (Hierarchical)	cols Information, Safety and Motion (P2P & Hierarchi	s, cal)
Implications of a Device Failure		Top priorities are av	/sic /ailability, safety, and ease-of-use	al
Threat Protection	Dete			
Upgrades and Patch Mgmt		ASAP During Unting	Scheduled	
Infrastructure Life Cycle	Equipm	Biggest pain point is th	ne management of who, what, where, ^{/rs)})
Deployment conditions	Contro	when, and how (peo	ple, data, <i>devices</i> , and processes)	
ahaha				

Common Security Issues in IoT Networks

Weak Access controls to Monitoring and other equipment

- Separation of duty for operator, administrator, audit
- Little or no Password management
- Physical segmentation
 - Dual-homed servers or PLCs act as Firewall
 - Segmented network has only physical security
- Unauthenticated command execution
- Communication is un-encrypted
- Outdated operating systems left unpatched
- Rogue wireless access points without encryption
- Insufficient controls on contractors (i.e. access policy, laptops, etcu.)





LAN Access(for machines) – security and normalization



Cisco Identity Services Engine

All-in-One Enterprise Policy Control Solution Leveraging Real Context that is Practical for Today's Threat Landscape

Provides ability to transfer your security policy from paper into technical rules that will be enforced electronically



- Who are you? → Bob
- What Device? → Contractor/Employee
- Where are you? \rightarrow Plant 1 zone 2
 - When? \rightarrow 11:00 AM on April 10th
- How ?

 \rightarrow Wired, Wireless, or VPN



Dynamic Segmentation Options: VLANs, DACLs, or TrustSec

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Intrusion Detection(for Things)



ISA3000 Summary

- Industrial, Energy, Marine, Railway Applications
 - Additional Certifications post-FCS
- Services include Firewall, VPN and IPS, DHCP, and NAT
- Two SKU's
 - Copper: 4x10/100/1000BaseT
 - Fiber: 2x1GbE (SFP), 2x10/100/1000BaseT
 - LED scheme is OT Ready
- Follows the Industry Leading Industrial Ethernet (IE) look/feel
- DIN Rail mounting with optional Rack Mounting
- Connectors: Management Interface (RJ45 and USB); Power supports 24-12 AWG; Factory Reset
- Thermals: -40C to 60C no airflow; -40C to 70C with 40LFM; -34C to 74C with 200LFM
- Hazloc with nA protection
- IEEE 1613, IEC 61850-3
- EFT in Summer '15 and Launch in Fall '15 © 2013-2014 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

ISA 3000 Copper







Cisco's Next Generation Firewall



CISCO

- World's most widely deployed, enterprise-class ASA stateful firewall
- Granular Cisco[®] Application
 Visibility and Control (AVC)
- Industry-leading FirePOWER next-generation IPS (NGIPS)
- Reputation- and category-based
 URL filtering
- Advanced malware protection

Next Generation Firewall - AMP

Transfer

Overview Policies Devices Objects FireAMP 🕕 Health System Help 🔻 admin 🔻 Analysis Context Explorer Connections • Intrusions
Files
Network File Trajectory Users v Vulnerabilities 🔻 Search Hosts 🔻 Correlation Custom • Network File Trajectory for 0517f034...588e1374 File SHA-256 0517f034...588e1374 👱 First Seen 2013-12-06 10:57:13 on i 10.4.10.183 2013-12-06 18:17:27 on i 10.4.10.183 File Name WindowsMediaInstaller.exe Last Seen File Type MSEXE Event Count 7 File Category Executables Seen On 4 hosts Current Disposition 🔆 Malware 🥖 Seen On Breakdown 2 senders → 3 receivers Threat Score eeeo High 🚓 Trajectory Dec 06, 2013 10:57 17:40 18:06 18:10 18:14 18:17 Ø 10.4.10.183 Q Ø Ó 0 10.5.11.8 10.3.4.51 10.5.60.66 Events Transfer Block (+) Create Move Execute 🕟 Scan 🕤 Retrospective 📵 Quarantine Dispositions 🔿 Unknown 🔷 Malware 🔘 Clean 🔿 Custom Unavailable Events Time Event Type Sending IP **Receiving IP File Name** Disp.... Action Protocol Client Web Ap... Description 2013-12-06 10:57:13 Retrospectiv.. Malwa. 2013-12-06 17:40:28 10.4.10.183 10.5.11.8 WindowsMediaInstaller.... Malware Cloud L. HTTP Firefox Retrospective Event, Fri Dec 6 ... Transfer Unkn... 2013-12-06 18:06:03 Transfer 10.5.11.8 10.3.4.51 WindowsMediaInstaller.... Unkn.. NetBIOS-... Retrospective Event, Fri Dec 6 ... 10.5.11.8 10.5.60.66 Retrospective Event, Fri Dec 6 ... 2013-12-06 18:10:03 Transfer WindowsMediaInstaller.... Unkn.. NetBIOS-... 2013-12-06 18:14:10 Retrospectiv.. Malwa. 2013-12-06 18:14:23 File Quaranti... 10.5.11.8 WindowsMediaInstaller.... Malwa.. 2013-12-06 18:17:27 10.4.10.183 10.5.11.8

WindowsMediaInstaller....

Malwa... Malware Block

HTTP

Firefox

Centralized management - FireSIGHT

Can be managed as other ASA with FirePOWER Services

- Management for multiple devices
- Comprehensive visibility and control over network activity
- Optimal remediation through infection scoping and root cause determination



MiTM Attack

- Intercept communication between two or more devices
- Modify and inject packets
- Many tools available

Ettercap Cain and able Dsniff

- Scope of attack: modify cause of transmission field (CoT)
- Intercept and set an invalid CoT value
- Detection with Snort(ISA3000)
- Source: http://www.slideshare.net/pgmaynard/man-inthemiddletalk

Scada Strangelove

- "Group of security researchers focused on ICS/SCADA security to save Humanity from industrial disaster and to keep Purity Of Essence"
- Scada Scanner readily-available
 Simple python script
 Return device-name, IP, software version



Cisco CyberSEC Assesment

THANK YOU!